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ANALYSIS OF THE FAILURE OF HUNGER AND POVERTY ERADICATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA AND SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS

The paper examines the reasons for the failure of the UN project of hunger and poverty eradication in sub-Saharan Africa, which remain an enormous social and economic challenge facing the region. The paper applies a qualitative approach and critically reviews secondary sources, i.e. a set of conceptual and literary review techniques. The novelty of the article is to highlight the reasons of failed hunger and poverty reduction project in sub-Saharan Africa and develop proposals for utilizing these reasons as a stimulus for renewed policy improvements for hunger and poverty reduction in sub-Saharan Africa during Sustainable Development era. Appropriate consultations are organized and a thorough analysis of the available literature on the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals in sub-Saharan Africa is performed. Findings indicate that the failure to reduce extreme poverty and hunger in sub-Saharan Africa was due to its poor structures, low agricultural productivity and lack of implementation mechanisms. The deficiencies inherent in government systems of sub-Saharan countries have exacerbated the situation. To successfully implement such projects, the region must undergo a convincing radical economic transformation that will solve the problems of low productivity. In particular, the article recommends improving the effectiveness of sub-Saharan Africa governments' policies through the involvement of local governments in the provision of services aimed at solving poverty. Long-term strategy involves convincing structural transformation of the region's

agriculture policies toward improved agricultural productivity, increasing social protection opportunities, inclusiveness and non-discriminatory empowerment of the region. Further research should evaluate the extent to which extreme poverty and hunger eradication has differed between the current Millennium Development Goals and the former Sustainable Development Goals.

Keywords: *poverty, hunger, productivity, agriculture productivity, manufactures, sub-Saharan Africa, economic development.*

Introduction. This paper revisits the failure of Millennium Development Goals (MDG) #1 in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), which was targeted to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger in SSA by 2015. Over the years, attempts at radical reforms have failed in SSA. These include: the 1980s IMF/World Bank-initiated Structural Adjustment Programs, purportedly designed to relieve African economies of economic imbalances and facilitate growth; the African Priority Programme for Economic Recovery, meant to address food scarcity and rehabilitate agricultural development within a time-frame; the 2003 Maputo Declaration, establishing the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme, committing to increase public investment in agriculture to 10 percent of members' national budget and grow agricultural GDP share to 6 percent [4]; the 2006 Alliance for Green Revolution in Africa, also to address Africa's food insecurity [44]; the 2010 SUN (Scaling Up Nutrition), envisaged to incorporate nutrition as an essential ingredient of food security programme [12]; the 1960s/1970s National Accelerated Food Production Programme, conceived nationally and supported by the World Bank to promote integrated rural development and; the 1976 Operation Feed the Nation, also conceived nationally to promote self-sufficiency in food production. With this list of failed projects, it could not be coincidental that the 2015 deadline for MDG#1 was not met in SSA.

SSA is depicted the poorest region globally, with 51.69 percent of the population rated poor during 1990-2013 [49]. In absolute numbers, SSA citizens living in poverty increased from 276 million in 1990 to 389 million in 2013 [49], i.e., an increase of about 40.9 percent. Earlier during 1981-1990, the situation was equally dismal; the region's citizens living on less than \$1.25 per day was 55.33 percent while those living under \$2.0 per day recorded a staggering 74.85 percent [48, p. 91-92]. Even the region's relatively affluent countries such as Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa have not escaped from the scourge of poverty [49, 40].

Extant research have tried to examine the structural issues that obstruct the development of SSA [18]. For instance, [1] argue that SSA exemplifies a region with poor welfare, inadequate health facilities, poor education, and constant high unemployment, lack of economic opportunities, food insecurity, and inefficient political systems incapable of providing services. However, research, which reviews the reasons for the failure of the MDG's goal of poverty eradication in SSA

is not common in the literature. But this aspect of research is needed to provide policy insight to help achieve poverty reduction during this period of sustainable development goals; hence this research is an attempt to fill this gap.

Relevance of the Article. This article provides robust discussion about the failure of MDG first goal, which was hunger and poverty reduction, by countries of SSA region. Since hunger and poverty reduction was carried over to the current Sustainable Development Goals era, the paper provides useful policy discussions, which focusses on building on the failure of previous MDGs' poverty reduction to gain improved understanding of the managerial intricacies to provide an experience to boost a realisable hunger and poverty reduction during the current Sustainable Development Goal Era. Accordingly, the paper provides theoretical support to show that Africa can transform the bad past experience to build strong institutions for the attainment of sustainable development goals SDGs' hunger and poverty reduction, which was not attained in Africa during the MDGs era.

The Aim of the Article and Innovation Character. This paper aims to distil the reasons for the failure of achieving hunger and poverty eradication in SSA by end of 2015. The novelty of this article are highlight the reasons of failed hunger and poverty reduction effort in sub-Saharan Africa based on review of scientific literature, and develop proposals for how these reasons could be utilized as a stimulus for renewed policy improvements for hunger and poverty reduction in sub-Saharan Africa during Sustainable Development era.

Method. The paper is purely qualitative in approach. It thus adopts a fusion of conceptual and literature review method. This method became appropriate given the nature of hunger and poverty reduction discourse, which is centred on the failure of planned hunger and poverty reduction targeted by MDG goal 1. Prior related literature on MDG in sub-Saharan Africa were consulted and synthesised.

Conceptualizing poverty and hunger. Poverty can broadly be classified as either absolute or relative. Absolute poverty is the inability to attain a minimum standard of living [22], measured in variables such as income, consumption, life expectancy or adult literacy [24]. Relative poverty, on the other hand, is the lack of resources to attain a socially acceptable quality of life, using as measure the national poverty line, adjusted to take into account changing needs, preferences and national standard of living [24]. The absolute approach is based on international thresholds for measurement, allowing cross-country comparison, while the relative approach uses society's norms and values to determine essential constituents of goods consumed by the poor and those by the non-poor. Whether in absolute or relative terms, poverty constitutes deprivations of sorts.

It remained contentious whether hunger is a problem of production and supply shortages or a problem of access and distribution until Amartya Sen's 1981 publication on the subject. The widely held view had been that hunger is a problem of food production and supply shortages due to poor climate conditions, re-

source mismanagement and overpopulation [44]. However, [36] changed that view, arguing that even when global production has increased hunger has persisted. Sen's major contribution is the inclusion of access and distribution, arguing that households could go hungry not just because of production and supply shortages but because such households may also lack access or entitlement to food, identified as lack of wage, social transfers and own production [36]. These factors are often symbolic of cruel institutions and norms. Addressing hunger therefore entails tackling dual problems of production/supply shortages as well as problems of poor access/distribution.

Hunger emanates from poor socio-economic and political circumstances which deprive people of endowment for production (e.g. land alienation or sickness-related incapacitated labour) or cause adverse changes to conditions of exchange, jeopardizing income distribution (e.g. loss of employment, food price increases, or poor social security). In the entitlement approach, primarily concerned with poor command over commodities, hunger is seen in relation to the concept of capability in which larger entitlements contribute to wider capabilities and vice versa [8], poverty/hunger depicting capability deprivation that results in malnourishment, sub-standard life and illiteracy [37]. Echoing Sen's contributions, [23] argues that embarking on quick fixes to achieve food security while neglecting distributive aspects of production inputs (labour, land and capital) and the actual production would mean overlooking structural (inadequate programmes and unproductive practices), environmental (drought and land degradation), and socio-economic (income inequality, unemployment, and input scarcities) causes of food insecurity. Related critical issues of utmost importance include improving productivity and diversification in agriculture that guarantee the autonomy of communities to determine own food systems and citizens to have sustained physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets active and healthy life dietary needs. Addressing these problems would mean beating hunger from root causes, rather than just addressing vertical short-term result-oriented approaches just to meet particular targets (such as MDGs 2015 targets). Short-term quick-fixes tend to favour measurable results, defining success in aggregate national estimates that are not easily disaggregated to track disparities amongst groups or address distributional dimensions. These are serious limitations and may explain the often misinterpreted actual poverty level in SSA. We will not attempt to incorporate into our analysis foreign aid, considered a quick-fix and unsustainable for growth [9]. Often, projects dry up as soon as aid dries up and subsidizing the poor through food aid can constitute disincentive effects on local production, especially if it becomes entrenched beyond emergency.

Characteristics of food production in SSA. Food output data for SSA is very poor, based mainly on national agricultural sample census that gives aggregate estimates based on unreliable rural household enquiries and population

data [10]. Inevitably, therefore, studies on SSA are based on several assumptions [1]. Nevertheless, early studies suggested that annual growth rate of food output pre-1970s was generally higher than population growth. For example, during 1950-1957, the annual food output growth in Nigeria and neighbouring Cameroon, Benin and Ghana, was estimated at 6.7 percent and the population at 2.5 percent [31, p.87]. Even with a sharp drop in Nigerian output, estimated at 3.1 percent during the country's civil war decade, 1960/1961-1970/1971 [35], it still surpassed the population growth rate. Food imports were mainly sugar, salt, wheaten flour and milk powder, all practically treated as luxuries, accounting for 82 percent of total food imports. These food items had no domestically produced close substitutes and their imports (excluding sugar) remained practically unchanged until the mid-1960s, recording just 3.2 percent of value added in domestic food production [21].

Noticeable stagnation in food output in SSA began in the 1970s, the post-independence decade for many countries in the region, and continued into the 21st century. For example, during 2000 and 2014, cereal output (wheat, rice, maize, barley, oats, rye, millet, sorghum, buckwheat, and mixed grains) in kilograms per hectare of 1131 kg and 1452 kg, compare poorly to the world average at 3063 kg and 3907 kg. Agricultural productivity, calculated as agricultural value added per worker, estimated in 2010 US dollars at \$776 (in 2000) and \$1223 (in 2015) was also the lowest among world regions but for a slightly poorer performance in South Asia in 2015 [49]. The advent of independence in the 1960s SSA inspired a significant rural-urban migration of youths, despite the fact that the region's agriculture was nowhere near mechanization to promote productivity. Agricultural output growth without productivity growth may be possible only if there is massive mobilization of labour (resource mobilization). Such output growth is often unsustainable, though, because labour cannot be mobilized forever without running into diminishing returns. In other words, mobilization of resources does not guarantee their efficient use or so-called factor productivity and even less likely in a struggling region with poor economic management [19, p. 31-32]

The post-independence decades also experienced political conflicts in several countries, caused by resentments among politically marginalized groups, with devastating consequences on the region's meagre resources and socio-political economy [3, p. 146]. Resources for development were diverted to finance conflicts instead. For example, the annual average increase in defence expenditure for SSA, base year 1980, rose from 24.1 percent during 1975-1984 to 88.4 percent during 1985-1989 [45, p. 204]; the level remained high at 81.3 percent in 2000. During 1970-2002, over 35 wars were fought in the region, majority of them intrastate. In a 5-year period to 1997, armed conflicts claimed about 2 million lives; by 2000 there were about 12 million refugees, over 40 percent of world total [2, p. 39]. In contrast, the region's share of global foreign direct investment in 1970, including agriculture, was a mere 5.5 percent; by 2000, it had fallen to 1 per-

cent [28], necessitating food imports or food aid to sustain the region's population. Imported food items in countries like Nigeria jumped to 14.8 percent in the 1970s and to a staggering 50 percent (for rice and maize) by the end of the decade and no longer comprised just the so-called luxuries but included staples that were formerly produced locally in sufficient quantity.

A common feature of SSA agriculture is the frequent involvement of its labour in non-agricultural activities. In the 1970s, for example, about 80 percent of rural adult male labour worked as farmers but only about 50 percent of that total worked full-time, the rest working part-time [27, p. 11]. Part-time farming was practical because of seasonal variations in agricultural activities; peak seasons required far more labour than an average farmer-family could supply and extra labour was hired. During off-peak seasons, the sector shed excess labour. With the exodus of rural labour to the cities, especially after the 1970s, the seasonal variations of farm work was no longer the practical reason for part-time farming. Instead, farmers could no longer meet their income obligations through farming and must resort full-time to non-agricultural activities such as plumbing, carpentry, barbing and trading, even during peak agricultural activities.

In light of the dwindling agricultural production, SSA embraced several successive initiatives (recall the introductory section), attempting to improve the sector's productivity; they introduced intensive project management and new technologies in form of fertilizers, insecticides, seeds, sprayers, and tractor units, administered through farm service centres, tasked also to administer credit, marketing and extension facilities. Over the long-run, labour productivity and economic growth are virtually synonymous and improved technology allows the production of more output from a given amount of capital and labour inputs [19, p. 27-28]. In contrast, low output despite introduced technologies would imply that labour lacks necessary human capital qualities for modern sector agriculture. According to [34], developing countries will remain pre-mature for industrialization without the necessary human capital qualities. Symbolic of SSA agricultural initiatives is their strategy of being out-come driven, short-term, instant gain-oriented thinking [12]. For example, the initiative, SUN, identified the fortification of foods and micronutrient supplementation as short-term solutions for acute malnutrition but had ignored the actual structural/socio-economic causes. Critics also condemn the gross exclusion of poor grass-root farmers (vulnerable to marginalization and discrimination, yet responsible for the bulk of agricultural production) from benefitting from important provisions, such as credits to purchase inputs. Available funds turned out appropriated instead to mainly rich businessmen pretending to practice mechanized farming [35]. Thus far, the SSA agriculture has failed to follow the development trajectory as in other successful regions.

Theoretical discussion. Overcoming extreme poverty and hunger require radical structural changes. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, among others, went

through radical structural changes to eradicate absolute poverty from their economies. They increased productivity in food production, became self-sufficient, these achievements also serving as a catalyst for their manufacturing sector development [13]. A radical structural change requires GDP shares of an economy's main competing sectors, namely agriculture and manufactures, adjusted with respect to their labour requirements. Agriculture provides labour, food and possibly foreign exchange and savings for manufacturing sector growth and, subsequently the entire economy. The manufacturing sector acts as productivity elevator, unconditionally converging with the global technology frontier, based on the available broad capabilities, namely, the economy's human capital, institutional structure, and political maturity [33]. Following [13], built on [20], we analyse a two-sector economy model of radical economic transformation, determining necessary conditions to meet a development goal.

The model

We assume a two-sector economy, agriculture and manufacturing, the former representing the rural sector and the latter the urban sector. (Inclusion of more sectors will not change the results) A structural change reallocates resources, mainly labour, between agriculture and manufacturing. If employment in agriculture declines, the employment in manufacturing increases, implying that a shrinking agricultural GDP share translates to an increasing manufacturing (and even services) GDP share. Agricultural labour productivity is assumed lower than manufacturing labour productivity, labour reallocation therefore possible without harming agriculture but rather increasing total labour productivity, through an increase in the manufacturing sector productivity. Thus, labour is shifted from low productivity agriculture, characterised somewhat by underemployment, though not a zero marginal productivity commonly assumed [13], to high productivity manufacturing striving for full capacity production. Allowing manufacturing sector absorb labour shed by agriculture favours industrialization and business generally but does not undermine the food producing agriculture that possibly generates foreign exchange and savings as well, structural change promoted in the process. A successful structural change should provide enough food for manufacturing sector employment. Exactly how agriculture fares in the process eventually will depend on the economy's structure which, in our analysis, could be open or semi-open. Suffice to note that if growth in staple food production is rapid enough, food and labour will remain cheap and labour intensive manufacturing and business in general will thrive. In contrast, low productivity agriculture means costly food, output lagging behind and labour, even if physically abundant, becomes expensive, restraining growth of the manufacturing sector, stalling business development.

Common among developing countries is that a bulk of the staple food consumed is produced locally and the proportion traded internationally very small, implying thin markets, domestic purchases and sales easily influencing prices

significantly. A major concern is how to prevent food shortages and allow rapid growth in the labour intensive manufacturing. Drastically reducing poverty and hunger is tantamount to promoting food production and encouraging manufacturing sector growth to produce goods and services. Agriculture and manufacturing must thrive for a successful structural change and economic transformation.

Economic transformation under different structures

Food shortages restrain radical economic transformation but could inspire structural change. In an open economy, characterized by free trade, prices exogenously determined, food can be imported to avoid shortages for manufacturing sector labour, and food price will not increase as manufacturing sector grows. The manufacturing sector output, savings and investment will not be limited by the economy's ability to produce food domestically nor must structural change or economic transformation lead to food price increase, thanks to the exogenously determined food price and the possibility to import food. Radical reforms will most likely succeed both agriculture and manufacturing contributing to government revenue through tax payments as well. Things may be different in a semi-open economy that characterizes countries in SSA where food is rarely imported and much domestic economic activities, including food production, are insulated from the impact of foreign trade and comparative costs. Food production is mainly for domestic consumption, prices endogenously determined by domestic supply and demand mechanisms and sometimes policy choices made by government. Food shortages due to poor labour productivity can, through increased food prices, impact significantly on domestic costs, including manufacturing sector labour wages. In very rare cases, where food is traded internationally, the markets are very thin, with only a small percentage actually traded. Consequently, any significantly large economy could, by its international purchases, impact significantly on prices of particular food items, causing increases in food prices and subsequently manufacturing labour costs through transmission mechanisms.

An expensive labour may encourage a launch of capital intensive technologies, slowing further economic transformation in a labour surplus economy. An unsuccessful economic transformation is therefore likely if an economy is semi-open as the manufacturing sector performance, even with its output traded internationally and prices exogenously determined, depends on the availability of domestic food production and productive labour availability. A rise in food prices due to low labour productivity will drive up manufacturing sector wages and costs generally, reducing profitability [16], causing producers to switch to capital intensive production techniques [13], and sometimes to total closures of manufacturing establishments, eroding businesses and restraining economic transformation. Manufacturing establishments could also remain in stunted existence, coping on a daily basis, profits just enough to sustain existence without growth. These imply that agricultural productivity growth must set in motion the pace for

any rapid growth of modern labour intensive manufacturing and businesses in general for a successful economic transformation capable of meeting targeted goals.

SSA failure to meet the MDG#1. Where did SSA go wrong in view of the two-sector model discussed in the previous section? The region has never really enjoyed even a once-off productivity increase, associated with [25], accompanying labour transfer from subsistence agriculture to modern manufacturing, implying there was no real increases in the proportion of the manufacturing sector's gainfully employed labour relative to the agricultural sector labour, mainly seen as underemployed. Any additions to urban labour from rural agriculture practically swelled just the already bloated urban informal sector. Evidence of any structural change by sector in SSA reveals that the agricultural sector share of employment which recorded 72.7 percent in 1960 had by 2010 decreased to 49.8 percent, the sector's relative productivity level stunted at 0.5 and 0.4 during the same periods. The manufacturing sector employment shares were equally dismal at 4.7 percent in 1960 and 8.3 percent 50 years later in 2010; the sector's relative productivity levels were even more dismal at 2.5 and 1.6 during the respective periods [14]. [49] has also noted the dismal performance by SSA manufacturing sector estimated at less than 1 percent of world total manufacturing value added during 2000 and 2015. The region's GDP at 1.5 percent and 1.9 percent of the world total during 2005 respective 2016, apparently the least of all world regions, also reveals poor performance [49]. The relative productivity levels in the industry sector as a whole worsened from 12.9 in 1960 to 5.5 in 2010. Not surprisingly, services employment shares increased steadily during the entire period, recording 18.0 percent and 36.8 percent during 1960 respective 2010, the reverse being the case though for its relative productivity levels at 2.7 and 1.6 during the respective periods. Obviously, the majority of migrant labour to the cities with no employment prospects in manufactures or related sectors settle for services, mostly informal, characterised by underemployment and low productivity. When productivity levels of a country or a region reach a certain depth, the likelihood is that there will not be enough income for proper distribution to citizens. In other words, it is impossible to generate wage gains that improve people's lives in a sluggishly growing economy.

[47, p. 6] also notes that SSA region was in a negative territory during 1990-2003, in terms of output growth per worker at -0.09 percent, physical capital per worker at -0.05 percent, and total factor productivity at -0.44 percent; the total factor productivity has remained negative since the 1960s. These poor performances reflect a failed structural change, a worsened poverty, hunger and inequality, and very minimal possibilities to meet the MDG#1. According to the [48, p. 97], in no SSA country is the Gini index less than 40, implying that many poor are very far below the poverty line rather than close to it, and therefore that economic growth may not really lead to poverty reduction in the region (Gini index measures an economy's level of inequality, using income or consumption expen-

diture; an index of 0 represents perfect equality while an index of 100 a perfect inequality). Among SSA relatively poor indexes at different periods are: 63.4 for South Africa (2011); 61.0 for Namibia (2009); 60.5 for Botswana (2009); 56.2 for Central African Republic (2008); 55.9 for Comoros (2004); 55.6 for Zambia (2010); 54.2 for Lesotho (2010); 51.1 for Swaziland (2009); 50.7 for Guinea-Bissau (2010); 50.4 for Rwanda (2013); 48.9 for Congo (2011); 48.5 for Kenya (2005); 47.3 for The Gambia (2003); and 46.1 for Malawi (2010) [49].

The SSA manifests deficiencies in broad capabilities, namely, productivity-enhancing human capital, institutional structure, and political competence [33], this is impacting adversely on manufacturing and agriculture. The region's manufacturing sector could not benefit from so-called automatic convergence factor, nor could it unconditionally converge with the world technology transfer, capable of elevating productivity even in agriculture, the result being that both sectors remain poor performers. The region's poor output per unit of labour is attributed to poor capabilities [33]. Critics hold that SSA growth rates in negative territory are reflections of the lack of technology [47, p. 6], a growing deindustrialisation in a number of member countries [14], and the region's inability to meet the MDG#1.

SSA Failure of MDG#1: A Lesson for Improvement in Poverty Reduction Strategy in Africa. The failure of MDG first goal of poverty reduction in Africa has been criticised by researchers [5, 6]. Development experts believe that the failures should provide an experience to boost a realisable SDGs' architecture in Africa [42]. This is because the global formulation and institutionalisation of SDGs has been made possible through the bad and good experiences of countries from the MDGs [42]. Accordingly, the test of lesson learned, which lies ahead, is how Africa can transform the bad experience to build strong institutions for the attainment of sustainable development goals (SDGs), primarily, poverty reduction and hunger, which was not attained in Africa during the MDGs era. This is because the trajectories of failed MDGs in Africa have revealed governments' operational and institutional deficiencies that should be prioritised and refocussed to deliver SDGs targets for Africa [32].

Africa is said to be the only continent that failed to halve poverty by end of 2015 compared to Eastern Asian countries whose poverty rate was reduced to 4 % down from their 61 % poverty rate in 1990 [41]. Given the weakness in African governance [5, 50], the pro-poor donor policies by donor partners may not be completely regarded as unfair to the achievement of poverty reduction; the ineffectiveness in African government should also receive a fair share of the blame for unrealised poverty and hunger reduction in Africa [5, 30]. For instance, Figures 1 and Figure 2 depicts weakening government effectiveness in two Africa largest economies for the past eighteen years [50]. Whereas the World Bank provides a ratio of 2.5 as indicative of effective government, it can be seen that for the past eighteen years, the two African economic giants have remained on the

lower bounds of government effectiveness rating, with Nigeria pitching at a disturbing negative rating for the past eighteen years (Figure 1). South Africa, which had a slightly positive rating, can be seen to be experiencing an unfortunate decline in its government effectiveness (Figure 2). Since weak democratic governance reduces the extent of pro-poor growth [15, 26], in the absence of transparent intervention in African governance system, it seems unlikely that the expected pro-poor development in Africa may be achievable even under the SDGs [5]. This is because there remains a long way to effective government in African democracy as public governance venality is apparently systemic in Africa [26].

This paper is therefore concerned that given the trend of weak governance system in Africa [50], SDGs poverty eradication may remain unattainable for many Sub-Saharan African countries if the administrative structures regarding SDGs are not reconfigured. For example, given the past eighteen years of negative record of governance system in Nigeria (Figure 1), it becomes uncertain if SDGs can be achievable in some Sub-Saharan African countries such as Nigeria if donor finance for administration and operations of SDGs are left entirely in the hands of weak public governance [5].

Main Results of the Article. The results revolve around persistent problem of weak administrative structures that emanate from weaknesses in governance systems in sub-Saharan Africa. This is evident in non-transparent government machineries, which not only thwarts the hunger and poverty reduction effort, but also stifles effective monitoring. Where effective and transparent monitoring is beclouded, this leads to attendant lack of reliable data for planning and controlling. The reviews also indicate that hope for effective government in Africa appear gloomy as public government venality is pervasive across the sub-Saharan African region. The output per worker in the sub-Saharan Africa was very negative before and in the early years of MDGs. With such low output, it was unlikely that poverty reduction could be effected by end of MDGs in 2015 because without increased output, it is difficult to experience economic growth and poverty reduction. The literature results also disclose that the SSA region's low output stems from deficiencies such as productivity-enhancing human capital, low technology and low political competence.

Recommendation. Having seen that weak systems of government, amongst others, contributed to elusive poverty reduction in Africa [7, 29], the paper suggests that SDGs' institutional and operational structures should consider more involvement of foreign development partners in grass-root delivery of aids for poverty reduction. This should be combined with greater involvement of local level governments that host the majority of grass root beneficiaries of SDGs. This will ensure a focused policy and delivery of SDGs' services directly to where the greater population of the poor resides, which is the informal and traditional sector of African economy. This should be combined with greater involvement of local level governments that host the majority of grass root beneficiaries of SDGs.




Fig. 1. 18 years of negative government effectiveness in Nigeria
Source: authors' graph with data from [50].




Fig. 2. 18 years of declining government effectiveness in South Africa
Source: authors' graph with data from [50].

This will ensure a focused policy and delivery of SDGs' services directly to where the greater population of the poor resides, which is the informal and traditional sector of African economy [7]. Such reconfiguration might instil improved transparency in international and national contracts that the financing of SDGs requires. In addition, the AU should be more pragmatic in bridling the dictatorial penchant and excesses of African leaders, which exacerbates unaccountability and weakens the welfare of the poor. A system of reward and incentivisation of democratic excellence in African leadership especially regarding poverty reduction policy and pragmatic achievements during this period of SDGs is desirable to motivate leaders that manage to achieve poverty and hunger reduction. This should also require that targeted improvement in government effectiveness and improved political will toward poverty reduction should be a standing item in the AU's short and long term strategic planning and monitoring system. African countries can borrow administrative lessons from few successes of MDGs items in few African countries [39]; for example, the success recorded in universal primary education in South Africa and in HIV reduction in Ethiopia can be applied in MDGs hunger and poverty reduction in the entire Sub-Saharan Africa

Conclusion. The SSA failed dismally to meet the MDG#1; absolute poverty and hunger in the region remain. In no country in the region have any successful significant economic reforms been accomplished.

Drawing from the foregoing problems identified in this paper, which hindered the attainment of poverty and hunger reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa, the

paper makes the following recommendations for poverty and hunger reduction. In order to achieve SDG-1 (poverty reduction), the government must consider the following: 1. the need to strengthen SSA government policy through the institutionalisation of social protection such as through universal health insurance policy, introduction of social grants for the unemployed, physically impaired, the elderly and for the foster caring motherless children; 2. the need to include financially backed pragmatic policy for mitigating and adapting to climate change mostly for the vulnerable rural poor population. In order to achieve SDG-2 (hunger reduction), the government must consider the following: 1. there is the dire need for improving agricultural productivity; 2. enhanced technological assistance in food processing; 3. enhanced creation of employment and upgrades in rural infrastructure; 4. incentives to obviate natural resource degradation and improved rural health-care and human resource capacitation for self-employment.

The poor trend of government effectiveness in SSA requires an improved reconfiguration of SGGs administration machinery to include the assistance of partner countries and the involvement of grass root local government participation in pro-poor SDGs operations; the AU can assist in realising MDGs by using its political powers to bridle dictatorial penchant and excesses of some African leaders; this can be achieved by making government effectiveness and political will toward SDGs to be a standing item in the AU's parliament long and short-term strategy.

For the longer term, a convincing structural transformation of the region's agriculture would entail change in policies, radicalizing production methods, improving seed breeds through extensive research, minimizing drought-related destruction and soil degradation by investing in dams and irrigation systems, improving marketing facilities (including roads and transportation systems), closing the ever enduring education deficit and, very importantly, changing the mind-set of youths towards farming. Perhaps, countries in the region should also consider imposing stiff taxes on dormant lands and offer tax credits as incentives on lands that are used productively. Investigating these call for further research.

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АНАЛІЗ НЕВДАЛОГО ПРОЄКТУ ВИКОРІНЕННЯ ЗЛИДНІВ У КРАЇНАХ АФРИКИ НА ПІВДНІ ВІД САХАРИ І ПОЛІТИЧНІ НАСЛІДКИ ДЛЯ ЕКОНОМІЧНОГО РОЗВИТКУ

Розглянуто причини невдалого проєкту ООН з ліквідації бідності та голоду в Африці на півдні від Сахари, що залишається величезною соціальною та економічною проблемою, яка стоїть перед регіоном. У роботі застосовано якісний підхід і критично розглянуто вторинні джерела, тобто комплекс концептуальної та літературної методик огляду. Новизною статті є висвітлення причин неспішності проєкту з ліквідації голоду та фактичної безрезультатності зусиль, спрямованих на зменшення бідності у досліджуваному регіоні, а також розроблення пропозицій щодо використання цих причин як стимулу для перегляду, оновлення та поліпшення політики зі зменшення бідності в епоху сталого розвитку. Організовано відповідні консультації, виконано ретельний аналіз наявної літератури щодо реалізації Цілей Розвитку Тисячоліття у країнах, розташованих південніше від Сахари. Результати огляду показали, що проєкт не виконано через низький рівень розвитку структури регіону і відсутність механізмів упровадження. Недоліки, властиві державним системам країн, розташованих південніше від Сахари, ще погіршили ситуацію. Задля успішного провадження таких проєктів регіон повинен здійснити переконливу радикальну економічну трансформацію, яка дасть можливість вирішити проблеми низької продуктивності. Зокрема рекомендовано вимагати підвищення ефективності діяльності урядів шляхом залучення органів місцевого самоврядування до надання послуг, спрямованих на вирішення проблем бідності. Довгострокова стратегія передбачає переконливу структурну трансформацію аграрної політики регіону, орієнтовану на покращення продуктивності сільського господарства, нарощування можливостей соціального захисту, інклюзивності та недискримінаційного розширення прав і можливостей населення регіону. У результаті подальших досліджень варто буде оцінити, наскільки постановка питань боротьби з бідністю та ліквідації голоду є різними у чинних Цілях Розвитку Тисячоліття та колишніх Цілях Стабільного Розвитку.

Ключові слова: бідність, голод, продуктивність, продуктивність сільського господарства, виробництво, країни Африки на південь від Сахари, економічний розвиток.